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TEACHING INDIAN LAW IN AN ANTI-TRIBAL ERA 
ALEX TALLCHIEF SKIBINE∗ 
 
One year, on the last day of my federal Indian law class, one student 
asked me whether in answering the exam, I wanted her to answer according 
to what the law was or what I thought the law should be.  Her question 
reminded me of Robert Laurence’s article criticizing some scholarship for 
being perhaps a little out of touch with reality.1  Was this student criticizing 
my teaching the same way Laurence was criticizing some of our scholar-
ship?  The truth be told, for some years now, I have found that teaching 
Indian law can have a depressing effect.  This effect, of course, is due to the 
Supreme Court decisions I teach in the class. 
I graduated from law school in 1976.  This was a period of activism 
and hope for Indian rights.  I started teaching in 1989 and although there 
had been by then some negative Supreme Court cases, the overall record 
was still pretty good.  It has now been thirty years since I began to practice 
Indian law and about seventeen years since I began teaching it and any 
feelings of hope have long dissipated.  In fact, the general wisdom now is to 
advise Indian tribes to avoid the Supreme Court at all costs.  The class that 
had the most effect on me, as far as installing a desire to practice Indian 
law, was a class given by Charles Wilkinson in 1973 at the Pre-law 
Summer Institute for Indian students at the University of New Mexico.  
Wilkinson was then a young attorney working for the Native American 
Rights Fund and the class was called something like “Indian Advocacy” 
and it was really a legal writing class focusing on writing memos and briefs 
for imaginary Indian tribal clients.  This class resonated so much with me 
because it was empowering.  It made students believe that by using the law, 
they could bring justice to their tribal clients. 
About seven years ago, I was given the opportunity to teach summer 
classes at Lewis and Clark, and after teaching the increasingly more 
depressing basic Indian Law 101 class the first year, I decided that next 
year, I wanted to teach a new class, one that would reinvigorate me or, at 
 
 ∗S.J. Quinney Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law; J.D., 
Northwestern University.  I want to thank Suzanne Darais for her research assistance.  I also want 
to thank the participants of the Indian Law Pedagogy Symposium held at the University of North 
Dakota School of Law, as well as the S.J. Quinney College of Law’s Faculty Development Fund 
for its financial assistance. 
1. See Robert Laurence, Indian Law Scholarship and Tribal Survival: A Short Essay 
Prompted by a Long Footnote, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 503 (2002-2003). 
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least, give my students the same kind of feelings and hopes I had 
experienced, taking Wilkinson’s class in that summer of 1973.2 
In this essay, after first giving a brief description of the two new 
courses I devised to avoid focusing mostly on Supreme Court cases, I look 
at the reasons for my depressive outlook on the Supreme Court.  Because I 
have identified 1988 as the turning point in the Court’s attitude toward 
tribal rights, I contrast this last nineteen-year period, 1988-2005, with the 
previous nineteen years, 1968-1987.  Some may point out that this kind of 
research has already been done by others, most notably by David Getches in 
his landmark article, Beyond Indian Law.3  In this article, I focus more on 
the Justices’ individual records and conclude that previous theories, 
including Getches’ and my own,4 were perhaps incomplete as far as ex-
plaining what the Court has been doing in its federal Indian law decisions.5  
In this article, rather than attempting to go beyond Beyond Indian Law, I 
merge Getches’ thesis with my previous efforts in order to come up with a 
new theory attempting to explain the Court’s decisions in the field.  
Because the new courses I have devised focus on lower courts’ decisions 
and federal Indian legislation, I conclude by contrasting the Court’s record 
with the record of the lower courts and the record of Congress on Indian 
issues. 
The first course, “Indian Legislation,” was created for the Indian law 
summer program at Lewis and Clark University’s Northwestern School of 
Law.  This class focuses on the major acts of Congress enacted since the 
late 1960s, the era of Indian self-determination, and on the Courts’ 
decisions which have interpreted such statutes.  In the last part of the class, 
students are required to draft their own bills.  The class then becomes an 
imaginary committee of Congress and students are asked to first testify on 
 
2. Although I am sure that at least Wilkinson has remained somewhat optimistic.  See 
generally CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS 
(2005). 
3. See David Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of States’ Rights, 
Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267 (2001) (arguing that the 
Court’s agenda in Indian cases is driven by the Court’s concerns about protecting state’s rights, 
and mainstream values as well as an antagonism toward recognizing special rights for racial 
minorities). 
4. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Redefining the Status of Indian Tribes Within “Our 
Federalism”: Beyond the Dependency Paradigm, 38 CONN. L. REV. 667 (2006). 
5. The following sources provide some of the most perceptive articles in this area beyond the 
Getches’ article.  ROBERT WILLIAMS, LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, 
INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA (Univ. of Minn. Press 2005); 
Phillip Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law 119 HARV. L. REV. 431 
(2005); Daan Braveman, Tribal Sovereignty: Them and Us, 82 OR. L. REV. 75 (2003); and Sarah 
Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and Tribal Sovereignty, 
50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177 (2001). 
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bills drafted by fellow students, and then to propose amendments to those 
bills in mock mark-up sessions of the committee.  In some of the classes, I  
asked students to write a legislative report at the conclusion of the course, 
in others I gave them a short answer, two-hour exam.6 
The second course, “Current Issues in Federal Indian Law,” was 
created when I was given the opportunity to visit Harvard in the spring of 
2004.  In this class, I focus on issues that have not been conclusively 
resolved by the Supreme Court.  Although I do include very recent Supreme 
Court cases, which were decided in the last year or two where some issues 
have not been conclusively resolved,7 the bulk of the cases studied are 
lower court cases decided in the last couple of years.  In the last part of the 
class, I ask the students to take one of the cases we studied and conduct a 
moot court argument with the rest of the class acting as the Supreme Court.8 
II. ASSESSING THE COURT’S INDIAN LAW RECORD 
A. 1968-1987 
I have determined that 1988 is perhaps the turning point in the Court’s 
Indian law jurisprudence.  I could have chosen 1986, the year Rehnquist 
became Chief Justice and Scalia replaced Chief Justice Burger on the Court, 
but in my mind, the anti-Indian majority on Indian issues did not begin to 
gel until 1988, the year Justice Kennedy replaced Justice Powell.  Besides, 
perhaps two of the last most meaningful pro-tribal decisions were issued in 
1987.  Iowa Mutual v. Laplante9 reaffirmed and extended the Court’s earlier 
decision in National Farmers Union v. Crow Tribe.10  Additionally, in that 
year, California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians11 represents perhaps 
the most significant Tribal victory in using the Indian preemption test to 
prevent assertion of state jurisdiction in Indian Country. 
 
6. Not surprisingly, I have found that the existence of an exam motivates the students to read 
and remember the cases and statutes covered in the first part of the class. 
7. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004), and Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001), are 
good examples of such cases.  In Lara, the Court did not rule on whether non-member Indians 
being prosecuted by the tribes were being denied due process of law.  In Hicks, the Justices could 
not agree, for the purpose of determining whether the tribe had jurisdiction, on how important it 
was that the land where the non-member activities took place was owned in trust by a tribal 
member. 
8. I have at times, modified this approach and asked students to draft legislation that 
represents how they think Congress should resolve the questions currently being addressed by the 
lower courts. 
9. 480 U.S. 9 (1987). 
10. 471 U.S. 845 (1985). 
11. 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
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From 1968 to 1987, there were a total of seventy-five Indian cases 
decided by the Court.  By my subjective count, tribal interests won forty-
two of those cases, while losing twenty-eight.  I classified the remaining 
five as neutral.  The first meaningful tribal defeat did not come until 1975, 
in Decoteau v. District Court,12 which was a reservation disestablishment 
case.  This case was quickly followed by Moe v. Confederated Salish & 
Kootenai Tribes13 in 1976, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip14 in 1977, 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe15 in 1978, Washington v. Confederated 
Tribes of the Colville Reservation16 in 1980, and Montana v. United States17 
in 1981.  Another significant tribal defeat during this period includes Rice v. 
Rehner18 in 1983. 
Yet, this period contained a substantial amount of significant tribal 
victories as well.  Thus, tribal land claims and treaty claims were upheld in 
Oneida II,19 and the Washington treaty fishing case.20  Breach of trust 
claims were validated in Mitchell II.21  The tribes also fought successfully 
against reservation disestablishment attempts in Mattz v. Arnett,22 and 
Solem v. Bartlett.23  Although it suffered a couple of meaningful defeats in 
Oliphant and Montana, the concept of tribal sovereignty was upheld in a 
majority of cases.24  Perhaps, even more significantly, tribal interests won a 
majority of cases involving the states’ attempt to assert jurisdiction in 
Indian Country.25  Even the Plenary Power of Congress was qualified in 
 
12. 420 U.S. 425 (1975). 
13. 425 U.S. 463 (1976) (deciding state taxation of Indian cigarette sales to non-members). 
14. 430 U.S. 584 (1977) (deciding reservation disestablishment). 
15. 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding no inherent tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians). 
16. 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (deciding state taxation of tribal cigarette sales to non-members). 
17. 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (holding no tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members on non-
member fee land within Indian reservation except in narrow circumstances). 
18. 463 U.S. 713 (1983) (finding state concurrent jurisdiction over liquor regulations). 
19. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985). 
20. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). 
21. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983). 
22. 412 U.S. 481 (1973). 
23. 465 U.S. 463 (1984). 
24. The following cases represent some of the most notable cases.  Iowa Mutual Ins. v. 
LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987); Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985); 
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 
49 (1978); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 
(1975). 
25. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987); New Mexico 
v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983); Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 
458 U.S. 832 (1982); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980); Cent. 
Mach. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 
(1976); McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). 
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Morton v. Mancari,26 Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks,27 and 
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians.28  All in all, tribes lost some signi-
ficant cases, but they won substantially more than they lost. 
B. 1988-2006 
Only forty-eight Indian cases were decided in the next nineteen years, 
which is a substantial reduction from the seventy-five decided during the 
previous period.  Of these most recent cases, tribal interests lost thirty-three 
while only winning eleven.  I classified four as neutral.29  The numbers may 
be a little different depending on who is doing the counting because in some 
cases, whether the case is an Indian victory or defeat is a little subjective.30  
Generally speaking, however, the tribes can be said to have lost by a three-
to-one margin. 
1. Tribal Defeats 
Of the thirty-three cases decided against the tribal position, it is 
significant that, except for the three cases decided against the Oklahoma 
State Tax Commission, the tribes lost all the cases involving assertion of 
state jurisdiction inside Indian Country.31  The tribes also lost all their 
attempts to sue states or counties, either because of state sovereign immu-
nity,32 or because they were not a person under federal statutes waiving 
such immunity.33  Perhaps, more meaningfully, except for the mixed result 
 
26. 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (stating that Congress’s actions have to be rationally tied to its trust 
responsibilities when treating tribal members differently than non-members). 
27. 430 U.S. 73 (1977) (providing that the political question doctrine was no longer appli-
cable to shield acts of Congress from judicial review). 
28. 448 U.S. 371 (1980) (explaining that Congress can no longer be presumed to have acted 
in good faith for the benefit of Indian tribes when it took property from Indian tribes). 
29. Classified as neutral were: Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993), and two water rights 
cases, Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1993) and California v. United States, 490 U.S. 
920 (1989).  In these two water rights cases, the lower courts were upheld by a 4-4 tie vote 
without a decision being issued.  Also classified as neutral was the first Oregon v. Smith, 485 U.S. 
660 (1988), which remanded the case to the Oregon Supreme Court. 
30. For instance, I counted Brendale v. Confederated Tribes, 492 U.S. 408 (1980), as an anti- 
Indian case, although part of the case went for the tribe.  I also counted Oklahoma Tax 
Commission v. Chickasaw, 515 U.S. 450 (1995), as an Indian victory since the state was not 
allowed to tax transactions involving non-Indians on reservations.  However, part of that case 
allowed state taxation of Indians working on the  reservation but domiciled outside of it. 
31. See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005); Wagnon v. Prairie 
Band of Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005); Cass County v. Leech Lake Band, 524 U.S. 103 
(1998); Dep’t of Taxation v. Milhelm, 512 U.S. 61 (1994); County of Yakima v. Confederated 
Tribes, 502 U.S. 251 (1992); Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989). 
32. See Idaho v. Coeur D’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 
U.S. 44 (1996); Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991). 
33. See Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians, 538 U.S. 701 (2003). 
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in Brendale,34 the tribes lost all cases involving tribal attempts to assert civil 
or criminal jurisdiction over non-members.35  Tribal interests also lost all 
three disestablishment of Indian Country cases36 and the two cases 
involving religious and cultural rights.37 
2. Tribal Victories 
Among the eleven victories, three came at the expense of the 
Oklahoma Tax Commission, perhaps signifying a case of overreaching by 
an overly eager state agency. 
In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi,38 the 
state was trying to collect taxes from the tribe and the tribe successfully 
argued that it had sovereign immunity.  In Sac & Fox Nation,39 Oklahoma 
was trying to tax Indians within Indian Country.  The Court held state 
authority precluded under long standing precedents, most notably, 
McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission.40  In Chickasaw,41 the Tax Com-
mission lost because it was trying to tax transactions occurring on Indian 
lands when the legal incidence of the tax was clearly on the Indians. 
Of the other eight decisions, United States v. Lara,42 upholding the 
power of Congress to confirm tribal inherent powers, is perhaps the most 
meaningful.  Another important tribal victory was Mississippi Band of 
Choctaw v. Holyfield.43  Finally, tribal sovereign immunity from suit was 
upheld in Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies,44 although the Court 
appeared lukewarm at best towards the concept of tribal sovereign 
immunity. 
 
34. The tribe won the right to zone non-member fee land located in the “closed” section of 
the reservation while losing the right to zone such non-member land in the “open” part of the 
reservation. 
35. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993), 
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 
(2001); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
36. See Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S.  
329 (1998); Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie, 523 U.S. 751(1998). 
37. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Employment 
Div. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  Indian interests also lost the one other case the 
Court had decided in 1986, Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
38. 498 U.S. 505 (1991). 
39. Tax Comm’n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993). 
40. 411 U.S. 164 (1973). 
41. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995). 
42. 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
43. 490 U.S. 30 (1989) (defining the concept of “domicile” for the purposes the Indian Child 
Welfare Act so as to preserve tribal court jurisdiction in this case). 
44. 523 U.S. 751 (1998). 
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While United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe45 is a meaningful 
decision in the breach of trust cases, the defeat of the Navajo Nation in its 
breach of trust cases on the same day somewhat negates this victory and is 
perhaps more meaningful in the long run.46  The Cherokee Nation won an 
important contract dispute case against the United States,47 but that case did 
not concern tribal rights as such and was decided on general contract law 
principles.  The last two pro-tribal cases involve tribal treaty rights: Idaho v. 
United States concerned the ownership of the bed of a lake,48 and 
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians was an off-reservation 
treaty rights case.49  Before drawing some more normative conclusions 
from the Court’s overall record during this period, I will look more 
specifically at the individual record of the Justices from 1991-2005. 
C. THE JUSTICES’ INDIVIDUAL RECORDS SINCE 1991 
The analysis below shows that from 1991 until 2005, four out of the 
nine Justices who were on the Court during that time hardly ever supported 
tribal interests.  If, as mentioned earlier, an anti-Indian bias began to gel in 
1988 with the arrival of Justice Kennedy, it did not solidify until Justice 
Thomas replaced Justice Marshall in 1991.  In this section, I analyze the 
record of those I consider to be, the four most anti-tribal Justices: 
Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy. 
1. The Gang of Four 
During this time, although Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, Thomas, and 
Scalia supported the Kiowa Tribe in its sovereign immunity case, the 
Cherokee Nation in its contract dispute with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 
and ruled against the Oklahoma State Tax Commission in its three cases,50 
 
45. 537 U.S. 465 (2003). 
46. United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 493 (2003). 
47. Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 634 (2005). 
48. 533 U.S. 262 (2001). 
49. 526 U.S. 172 (1999). 
50. I do not want to underplay these three Oklahoma state tax commission decisions, because 
they provide meaningful markers as to how far states can push the envelope before running into 
problems with the Court.  Potawatomi was based on tribal sovereign immunity, and Chickasaw 
involved the taxation of tribal transactions with non-members when the “incident” of the tax was 
clearly on the tribe.  In Sac & Fox, the Court found that the state could not tax the income of tribal 
members residing on the reservation or impose fees on member owned vehicles maintained on 
tribal lands.  These traditional immunities from taxation had been recognized since the landmark 
decisions in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), and Washington 
v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).  The state thought 
that since the lands at stake were not part of a reservation, but instead consisted of isolated tracts 
of trust land, the state could tax them.  The state was wrong.  As such, this case is not about state 
jurisdiction as much as what constitutes Indian Country.  The Court did reaffirm the principle that 
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they ruled against tribal interests in all the other Indian cases.51  Notably, 
unlike the other five Justices, these four all dissented in United States v. 
White Mountain,52 Idaho v. United States,53 and Minnesota v. Mille Lacs 
Band.54  Furthermore, the opinions of Justices Kennedy and Thomas in 
Lara cannot be considered as endorsing the reasoning of Justice Breyer’s 
majority opinion.  More indicative, it seems that since 1991, the year they 
were all together on the Court, with the exceptions of Justice Rehnquist 
joining the Lara decision,55 and Justice Kennedy joining the Wagnon 
dissent,56 these four Justices sided against tribal interests in thirty out of 
thirty-five cases—a ratio of six to one. 
That these four Justices can be counted to almost always vote against 
tribal interests is meaningful in that only one Justice among the remaining 
five is needed to constitute an anti-tribal majority. 
2. The Not-So-Fab Five 
In this section, I look at the record of the remaining five Justices during 
these same years: Justices O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and 
Stevens.  The only decisions that really set these five apart from the pre-
vious four is that they all voted for the tribes in the White Mountain breach 
of trust case, and the two treaty cases: United States v. Idaho and Minnesota 
v. Mille Lacs Band.  Except for Justice Ginsburg, they also all voted for the 
tribe in the Navajo Nation breach of trust case.  Their overall record, how-
ever, still reflects mostly antagonism toward tribal interests.  As previously 
noted by Sarah Krakoff,57 some of the decisions that went against tribal 
interests are striking because they were unanimous: Cass County v. Leech 
Lake Band of Chippewa Indians,58 Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians 
of the Bishop Community,59 Department of Taxation & Finance of New 
 
as long as the trust lands are within Indian Country, the state cannot impose a tax directly on the 
tribes or tribal members. 
51. The lone exception here is the relatively early case of Mississippi Band of Choctaw v. 
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989), where Justice Scalia did vote with the majority.  Justices Thomas 
and Kennedy were not yet on the Court. 
52. 537 U.S. 465 (2003). 
53. 533 U.S. 262 (2001). 
54. 526 U.S. 172 (1999). 
55. Although Justice Rehnquist joined the Breyer majority opinion for the Court, it is 
difficult to figure out what motivated Justice Rehnquist to do so.  Perhaps, he was able to 
somewhat influence the tone of Justice Breyer’s opinion by joining. 
56. Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005). 
57. See Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and 
Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1178 (2001). 
58. 524 U.S. 103 (1998). 
59. 528 U.S. 701 (2003). 
      
2006] TEACHING INDIAN LAW 785 
York v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc.,60 South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux 
Tribe,61 and Alaska v. Native Village Of Venetie Tribal Government62 are 
all unanimous decisions dealing with either assertion of state regulatory 
power in Indian Country or the existence of Indian Country.63  It is also 
notable that in the area of inherent tribal sovereignty, Duro v. Reina,64 
Strate v. A-1 Contractors,65 and Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley,66 were all 
unanimous decisions. 
Two other cases are worth mentioning.  Although Chickasaw Nation v. 
United States is, on the surface, a case about federal taxation of Indian 
gaming enterprises,67 it is mostly a case about the unwillingness of the 
Justices to apply the Indian canon of statutory construction to resolve 
statutory ambiguities in favor of the Indians.  Only two Justices, O’Connor 
and Souter, supported the tribal position.  Finally, City of Sherrill stands 
alone, perhaps because of its outrageousness.68  It is both emblematic and 
ironic that Justice Stevens was the only dissenter.  It is emblematic because 
he was the sole dissenter.  It is ironic because he wrote the dissenting 
opinion in the 1985 decision in Oneida II.69  This leads me to conclude that 
from one of the most anti-tribal Justices in 1985,70 Justice Stevens had 
somehow become, twenty years later, the least anti-tribal Justice.71 
To sum up, the Gang of Four is still willing to recognize the concept of 
tribal sovereign immunity, as well as an immunity from state taxation when 
the incidence of the tax falls directly on the tribes or their members.  They 
are also not adverse to siding with the tribes in contractual disputes with the 
federal government.  In addition to supporting the tribal position in such 
cases,72 the Not-So-Fab Five seemed mostly willing to support tribal 
 
60. 512 U.S. 61 (1994). 
61. 522 U.S. 329 (1998). 
62. 522 U.S. 520 (1998). 
63. The only exceptions in this area of the law seemed to have been Justice Souter joining 
Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Hagen and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Wagnon.  Justice Souter 
also joined Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Bourland, however, he seemed to have had a change of 
heart about Indian law after Justice Blackmun left the Court in 1994. 
64. 495 U.S. 676 (1990). 
65. 520 U.S. 438 (1997). 
66. 532 U.S. 645 (2001). 
67. 534 U.S. 84 (2001). 
68. 544 U.S. 197 (2005).  See Joseph W. Singer, Ninth-Tenths of the Law: Title, Possession, 
and Sacred Obligations, 38 CONN. L. REV. 605 (2006). 
69. 470 U.S. 226 (1985). 
70. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
71. Of course, I do not deny that Justice Stevens may have become more sensitive to tribal 
interests since 1985. 
72. But see Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., 523 U.S. 751, 760-66 (1998) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
      
786 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 82:777 
interests in cases involving treaty protected tribal property rights and breach 
of trust cases against the federal government.73  Occasionally, some of these 
five Justices will also support tribal interests in other areas.  Thus, Justice 
Ginsburg dissented in Wagnon (state tax), Justice Stevens dissented in 
Sherrill, and Justices O’Connor and Souter dissented in Chickasaw (federal 
taxation of tribal gaming revenues).  However, a super majority of Justices 
seem to always support the assertion of state jurisdiction when non-
members are at least partially involved.  And of course, none of the Justices 
ever seem to support tribal inherent jurisdiction over non-members.  
Finally, none of the Justices have supported tribes facing arguments that 
their reservations had been disestablished. 
D. NORMATIVE CONCLUSIONS 
Recently, after teaching the City of Sherrill case on my last day of 
class, I jokingly told my students that the following paradigm could explain 
the Court’s Indian law decisions: “Whenever the issue is truly important to 
non-Indians and Indians are on the other side of such issue, the Indians 
lose.”  I was surprised that more than a few students actually took me seri-
ously.  Although I realize that for some, this paradigm cannot be that easily 
discarded, I will resist for the time from drawing such conclusion.74 
Although I believe that Professor Getches is undoubtedly correct in 
asserting that the Court’s predisposition in favor of state rights, mainstream 
values, and colorblind justice, has worked to the detriment of Indian 
tribes,75 one has to wonder whether it can explain all these defeats.  It seems 
that, at least for the Gang of Four, antagonism toward tribal rights goes 
beyond the reasons given by Getches.  Furthermore, cases like Chickasaw 
Nation v. United States, involving federal taxation of Indian gaming reve-
nues, and the Navajo Nation breach of trust case, as well as cases such as 
 
73. But see United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 493 (2003).  Justice Ginsburg 
delivered the opinion of the Court.  Id. at 493. 
74. Such paradigm may explain, for instance, the dichotomy in the two breach of trust cases: 
Navajo Nation and White Mountain.  Not only did Navajo Nation involve hundreds of millions of 
dollars more than White Mountain, but the case could have been used as precedent by other tribes 
to successfully bring many more such cases.  Chances are, the situation in White Mountain was 
close to unique.  The issue there was the existence of trust duties in managing a specific property 
that had been transferred in trust for the benefit of the White Mountain Apache tribe.  The issue in 
Navajo Nation was whether the Secretary of the Interior had specific enough trust duties when 
approving tribal coal leases under the Indian Mineral Leasing Act, so that the breach of such 
duties could be compensable.  See Ezra Rosser, The Trade-off Between Self-Determination and the 
Trust Doctrine: Tribal Government and the Possibility of Failure, 58 ARK. L. REV. 291, 296-303 
(2006).  Even United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004), which I view as perhaps the most 
important recent decision for tribes, in fact did not affect non-Indians at all since the issue there 
was whether Congress could reaffirm tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians. 
75. See generally Getches, supra note 3. 
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Negonsott v. Samuels,76 Department of Interior v. Klamath Waters Users,77 
Amoco Production v. Southern Ute Tribes,78 and El Paso v. Neztsosie,79 do 
not fall in any of these three categories.  This survey seems to indicate that 
tribal interests are perhaps being subrogated to many other interests than 
just an interest in protecting state rights, mainstream values, and colorblind 
justice.  Although, of course, this depends on how broad one construes 
Getches’ three classifications.  Set forth below is a thesis that complements 
Getches’ theory, and may perhaps explain more accurately what the Court 
has been doing. 
Under what I have previously termed the Rehnquist Court’s Depen-
dency Paradigm of tribal incorporation,80 Indian tribes are “dependent” on 
the United States Congress for all their political rights.  I believe that at 
least the Gang of Four and Justice Souter have adopted the view that Indian 
tribes have no political rights except to the extent that such rights are 
delineated in treaties and acts of Congress.  Combining my previous theory 
with Getches’ thesis, I come to the following principle: The more tribal 
interests affect states’ rights, mainstream values, or colorblind justice, the 
more explicit such tribal interests or rights will have to be delineated in 
congressional legislation. 
This principle would explain the state jurisdiction cases.  Although 
vague, general congressional acts being considered against a backdrop of 
inherent sovereignty were enough to preempt state jurisdiction during the 
Marshall-Brennan era.81  The Rehnquist Court has demanded much more 
specific acts of Congress before finding state jurisdiction preempted, at 
least in cases where non-tribal members were, to some extent, involved.82  
This principle is even truer when the tribes attempt to exercise civil juris-
diction over non-members.  In such cases, after Strate and Hicks, it seems 
that the Court will not support tribal authority unless such authority has 
been somehow endorsed or at least acknowledged by Congress.  Even the 
recognition of tribal sovereign immunity in Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing 
 
76. 507 U.S. 99 (1993) (interpreting federal criminal laws). 
77. 532 U.S. 1 (2001) (applying the Freedom of Information Act in Indian affairs). 
78. 526 U.S. 865 (1999) (determining ownership of coal based on Coal Lands Act). 
79. 526 U.S. 473 (1999) (interpreting the Price-Anderson Act as creating exclusive federal 
court jurisdiction). 
80. See generally Skibine, supra note 4. 
81. See, e.g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983); Ramah Navajo 
v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 
136 (1980); Cent. Mach. v. Arizona, 448 U.S. 160 (1980). 
82. See Dep’t of Taxation v. Milhelm, 512 U.S. 61 (1994); Cotton Petroleum v. New 
Mexico, 490 U.S. 920 (1989); Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983). 
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Technologies,83 can be explained in this fashion.  Thus, in this case, even 
though the Court stated that tribal sovereign immunity was first recognized 
by the federal common law by “accident,” it remarked that Congress had 
endorsed and relied on that concept and that, therefore, it was now for 
Congress, and not the Court, to modify or abrogate such concept. 
If this principle is descriptively accurate, however, it reflects a 
normatively warped understanding of how and why federal common law 
should be used to protect tribal interests.  Although scholars have disagreed 
as to the extent of the federal courts’ power to create federal common law,84 
it is generally understood that before federal courts can “create” federal 
common law, there has to be at least a federal interest needing protection, 
and that this interest cannot be adequately protected by the courts using 
either the Constitution or acts of Congress.85  Yet, requiring an increasing 
amount of explicitness from Congress indicates that the Court is adverse to 
using federal common law in order to protect tribal interests.  This indicates 
that the Court may not be considering protection of tribal self-government 
as a fundamental federal interest worth protecting through the use of federal 
common law.  This position ignores the rightful role of the Indian trust 
doctrine and Indian treaties in the formulation of the federal common law. 
This position seems to assume that the trust doctrine was invented by 
the courts just because Indians were weak and defenseless, and can be 
conveniently ignored in the creation of federal common law.  But that is not 
the case.86  The trust doctrine originates not only in treaties signed between 
the tribes and the United States, but also in the decision to apply the 
 
83. 523 U.S. 751 (1998). 
84. See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. 
U. L. REV. 585 (2006) (surveying the various positions, and arguing that the making of federal 
common law should be grounded “in the protection of interests unrepresented or systematically 
underrepresented in the creation of state law”).  Disappointingly, the authors fail to acknowledge 
the field of federal Indian law as a special “enclave” of federal common law and do not even 
mention the field of Indian law except in footnote 331 where they seem to thank Joseph Singer for 
reminding them of the existence of the such field.  I guess the omission of such an obvious area is 
due more to the marginalization of the field of federal Indian law rather than a lack of adequate 
research in this otherwise excellent article. 
85. See Martha Field, The Legitimacy of Federal Common Law, 12 PACE L. REV. 303 
(1992). 
86. Philip Frickey has put forth elegant arguments describing the original Marshallian vision 
concerning the role treaties made with Indian tribes should play in the formulation of federal 
common law.  Frickey viewed treaties as quasi-constitutional in nature because they determined 
the terms of incorporation of Indian tribes within our political system.  See Philip Frickey, 
Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal 
Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381 (1993).  My theory is slightly different inasmuch as it 
considers the trust doctrine as derived from the doctrine of discovery and therefore a key element 
in determining the terms of incorporation for all Indian tribes.  My theory has also the benefit of 
being applicable to all Indian tribes and not only to the ones that signed treaties with the United 
States. 
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doctrine of discovery to Indian tribes in Johnson v. M’Intosh.87  A doctrine 
under which, the United States, as successor to England, is said to have 
obtained not only a certain amount of political “dominion” over Indian 
tribes but also the “ultimate” title to all Indian lands.  Under the discovery 
doctrine, the tribal nations were relegated to domestic dependent nations, 
and the complete right to their lands was transformed to a right of 
possession.  As such, the Indian trust doctrine as well as the treaties, are an 
intrinsic part of the terms under which Indian tribes were incorporated 
within the United States territorial and political boundaries.  The trust 
doctrine, therefore, cannot be ignored in the formulation of the federal 
common law. 
Because the Indian trust doctrine, along with the various treaties signed 
with Indian nations, defines the terms of incorporation of Indian nations 
within our political system, and because the essential purpose of the trust 
doctrine is to protect the survival of Indian Nations as distinct self-
governing political entities within our political system,88 the tribes’ rights to 
self-government should be enforced under federal common law, notwith-
standing the existence of specific statutes conferring explicit rights to 
Indian tribes.  In other words, the existence of an Indian trust doctrine signi-
fies that there is an on-going federal interest to guarantee the continuing 
existence of Indian tribes as self-governing sovereign entities within our 
political system.89  The Court’s task should not be to look for additional 
source of support for tribal self-government.  The opposite should be true.  
It should only be looking for treaties and acts of Congress that have taken 
 
87. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).  See ROBERT MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA, DISCOVERED AND 
CONQUERED 165-66 (Praeger 2006).  Some other scholars have taken the position that the trust 
doctrine is a product of treaties and acts of Congress.  Mary Christina Wood theorized that the 
trust doctrine is the result of the huge amount of Indian land transferred to the United States in 
treaties and acts of Congress.  Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native 
American Sovereignty, The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471.  While it is true 
that treaties and acts of Congress further defined the elements of the trust relationship, it ignores 
the fact that under Johnson v. M’Intosh, England acquired ultimate title to all Indian land upon 
discovery and the United States succeeded to such England claims.  So, although treaties 
dispossessed the tribes of the actual right of possession, their ultimate legal title had already been 
transferred to the United States or England at the time of discovery. 
88. Contrary to popular belief, Justice Marshall did not only imply the existence of a trust 
relationship in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831), where he referred to a guardian-
ward relationship.  In Worcester v. Georgia, the second sentence of the opinion declares that the 
Cherokees are “a people. . . under the protection of the United States.”  31 U.S. 515, 536 (1832).  
Later on, after describing all the Acts of Congress enacted up to that point, Marshall stated that 
such legislation “guarantied” the tribes’ rights to their lands and “contemplates the preservation of 
the Indian nations as an object sought by the United States.”  Id. at 557.  The recognition of a trust 
type relationship is implicit in the use of words such as “guarantied” and “preservation.” 
89. For a thoughtful and comprehensive argument supporting this point, see Mary Christina 
Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty, A New Trust Paradigm for Federal Actions 
Affecting Tribal Land and Resources, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 109. 
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such pre-existing tribal rights.  Although an argument could be made that 
since the initial Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts, Congress has changed 
its mind about the status of Indian tribes within our political system, and the 
Court’s methodology is only reflecting that fact, the last part of this article 
reveals this not to be the case.90 
Before looking at the congressional record in the final section of this 
essay, I first assess the Indian law record in the lower courts.  I then 
compare these two records to the one compiled by the Supreme Court. 
III. ASSESSING THE INDIAN LAW RECORD IN THE LOWER 
COURTS AND IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 
A. TRIBAL RECORD IN THE LOWER COURTS 
Because this essay is focused on what the Supreme Court has done, 
analyzing all the lower courts’ Indian law decisions is beyond the scope of 
this essay.  I focus here only on these decisions where certiori was granted 
by the Supreme Court.  One argument which could be made is that the dis-
mal tribal record in the United States Supreme Court is the product of tribal 
advocates, perhaps emboldened by their success in the previous era, getting 
overly optimistic and confident.  My survey, however, reveals this not to be 
the case. 
This conclusion can be derived by the number of cases won by the 
tribes at the lower level and reversed by the Supreme Court.  In other 
words, lower appellate level courts, which have to respect and follow 
Supreme Court precedents, thought they were applying existing law.  Yet, 
when ruling in the tribes’ favor, lower courts ended up being overturned at 
an extremely high rate by the United States Supreme Court.  For instance, 
in the area of tribal inherent sovereign power, tribal interests won in the 
lower courts in four of the five cases.91  Only in Strate, where there was a 
badly fractured en banc decision, did the lower court end up ruling against 
the tribal position.92  In Indian Country disestablishment cases, the tribes 
won at the lower level in Venetie and Yankton.93  While the Utah Supreme 
 
90. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85 NEB. L. 
REV. 121 (2006) (arguing that the present congressional policy is still to support tribal self-
government and that Supreme Court should look at such current congressional policy and 
legislation to formulate its federal common law jurisprudence on Indian issues). 
91. See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 210 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2000); State v. Hicks 196 
F.3d 1020, 1032 (9th Cir. 2000); Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir. 1987).  The tribal 
position also mostly prevailed in South Dakota v. Bourland, 949 F.2d 984, 996 (8th Cir. 1991). 
92. See A-1 Contractors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930, 941 (8th Cir. 1991). 
93. See Yankton Sioux Tribe v. S. Mo. Waste Mgmt., 99 F.3d 1439 (8th Cir. 1996); Alaska 
ex. rel Yukon Flats Sch. Dist. v. Native Vill. of Venetie, 101 F.3d 1286 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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Court ruled against the tribal position in Hagen,94 that decision had 
disagreed with a Tenth Circuit decision which had gone in the tribe’s favor 
ten years earlier.95  In cases involving assertion of state regulatory juris-
diction in Indian Country, the tribal position prevailed in five of the six 
lower courts’ decisions.96  Only in Cotton Petroleum, did the lower court 
rule in favor of the state.97  Other meaningful decisions that had gone in the 
tribes’ favor at the lower court level only to be reversed by the Supreme 
Court include Montana v. Crow Tribe,98 Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone 
Indians of the Bishop Community,99 United States v. Navajo Nation,100 
Amoco Production v. Southern Ute Tribe,101 and C&L Enterprises v. 
Citizen Band.102 
This abbreviated survey confirms that tribal rights advocates were not 
being overly aggressive or optimistic in their litigation strategies.  It is the 
Supreme Court that was being overly aggressive and activist in creating 
new doctrine or modifying applicable precedents in order to overturn lower 
courts decisions that had upheld tribal rights.  It seems that in the important 
areas of inherent tribal sovereignty and state regulations within Indian 
Country, only in three cases did the tribal interest not prevail in the lower 
courts: Seminole Tribe v. Florida,103 New Mexico v. Cotton Petroleum,104 
and Strate v. A-1 Contractors.  Also meaningful is the fact that in these 
areas of the law, the Supreme Court never actually upheld a lower court 
decision which had been favorable to the tribes. 
I mentioned earlier the City of Sherrill case as perhaps being in a 
special category because of the egregiousness of the opinion.  What con-
cerns me the most about this case is that it may be sending a message to the 
lower courts and this message is: “In important cases, if you do not want to 
be reversed, do not rule in favor of the tribes.  And if you ruled against 
 
94. State v. Hagen, 858 P.2d 925, 925-26 (1992). 
95. See Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985). 
96. See Prairie Band v. Richards 379 F.3d 979 (10th Cir. 2004); Oneida Indian Nation v. City 
of Sherrill, 337 F.3d 139, 140 (2d Cir. 2003); Milhelm Tea & Bros., Inc. v. Dep’t of Taxation, 615 
N.E. 2d 994, 998 (1993).  The tribes also prevailed, at least partly, in Leech Lake v. Cass County, 
108 F.3d 820, 829-30 (8th Cir. 1997).  See also Confederated Tribes v. County of Yakima, 903 
F.2d 1207, 1219 (9th Cir. 1990) (providing that state allowed to impose ad valorem tax but not 
excise tax on fee patented Indian owned land). 
97. Cotton Petroleum v. State, 745 P. 2d 1170 (1987). 
98. See Crow Tribe v. Montana, 98 F.2d 1194, 1195 (9th Cir. 1996). 
99. See Bishop Paiute Tribe v. County of Inyo, 291 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 2002). 
100. See Navajo Nation v. United States, 263 F.3d 1325, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
101. See S. Ute Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 151 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 1998). 
102. 532 U.S. 411 (2001). 
103. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
104. 490 U.S. 163 (1989). 
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them, we will find a way to uphold your decision.”  Certainly, the recent 
decision in Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki,105 extending the City of Sherill 
rationale to damage claims is indicative that at least some judges have heard 
the message.106 
B. ASSESSING THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD IN THE ERA OF INDIAN 
SELF-DETERMINATION 
Since the late 1960s, Congress is said to have adopted a policy of self-
determination for Indian tribes.107  This policy is still the official policy of 
Congress.  Thus, the passage of the Indian Self Determination Act 
(ISDA)108 in 1975, was followed by the Indian Child Welfare Act109 in 
1978.  Furthermore, the ISDA was strengthened by pro-tribal amendments 
in 1988110 and 1994.111  National environmental laws like the Clean Air, 
Clean Water, and Safe Drinking Water Acts were amended to allow tribes 
to be treated as states for the purposes of these laws.112  Tribal political 
rights were also recognized and reinstated in the 1990 Duro-Fix legisla-
tion.113  Tribal cultural rights were recognized and given protection in many 
statutes, the most important of which was the 1990 Native American Grave 
Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA).114 
Congress also acted to promote tribal economic development by 
passing legislation such as the Indian Financing Act of 1974,115 the Indian 
Mineral Development Act of 1982,116 The National Indian Forest Resource 
 
105. 413 F.3d 266 (2005). 
106. See id. at 273.  In City of Sherrill, the Court only held that an Indian tribe that had re-
acquired land in fee within their reservation could be taxed by the state, mostly because of the 
equitable doctrine of laches.  Id. at 273-80. 
107. See Tadd M. Johnson & James Hamilton, Self-Governance for Indian Tribes: From 
Paternalism to Empowerment, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1251 (1995). 
108. Pub. L. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2003 (1975). 
109. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978). 
110. Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration Project of 1988, Pub. L. 100-472, 102 Stat. 2296 
(1988). 
111. Tribal Self-Governance Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4272 (1994). 
112. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d) (2000) (providing tribal amendments to the 
Act); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000) (same); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 300j-11(b)(1) (2000) (same). 
113. Pub. L. 101-511, 104 Stat. 1892. 
114. 8 U.S.C. § 1170 (2000), 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2001).  In addition to NAGPRA, 
Congress also provided some protection for Indian archeological resources in the Archeological 
Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1994).  Congress also enacted the 1994 
amendments to the Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1994), the Native American 
Language Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2991b-3, 2992d(e) (1990), and the Indian Arts and Crafts 
Act of 1990, 25 U.S.C. §§ 305-305e (1990), 18 U.S.C. § 1159 (1994). 
115. 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (2000). 
116. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2108 (2000). 
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Management Act of 1990,117 and the Indian Tribal Government Tax Status 
Act118 also in 1982.  Perhaps the most recent meaningful legislation 
promoting tribal economic development was the Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Act of 1988 (IGRA).119  Although not originally universally endorsed by all 
Indian tribes, IGRA has been mostly successful for Indian tribes in spite of 
the Court’s effort to gut the Act in Seminole Tribe v. Florida.120 
It should also be noted that in the 1980s, Congress enacted numerous 
tribal-specific legislation which were supported by these tribes.  Such 
legislation includes many tribal water and land claims settlement acts, tribal 
restoration, and recognition legislation, as well as statutes transferring 
additional lands to specific tribes.  An unofficial count suggests that from 
1981 to 1988 alone, Congress enacted over fifty such statutes. 
On the other hand, some legislation is noteworthy because it was not 
enacted.  Thus, while Duro was overturned legislatively, Oliphant was not.  
Furthermore, none of the cases such as Hagen, Yankton, or Venetie, finding 
Indian reservations or Indian Country diminished or disestablished, were 
legislatively reversed or at least somewhat corrected.  The Montana line of 
cases, preventing tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members, have not been 
legislatively addressed.  Finally although P.L. 280 was amended in 1968,121 
it was never repealed nor further amended. 
Finally, it should be noted that although the Congress has been less 
active in enacting pro-tribal legislation since 1994, the year the Republicans 
took control of both Houses of Congress, the policy of promoting tribal 
self-determination has not been abandoned.122  Moreover, there has not 
been any truly anti-Indian legislation enacted since 1994. 
All in all, the record of Congress on Indian issues, while not the best 
that could be hoped for, is far fairer to Indian tribes than the one generated 
by the Supreme Court. 
 
117. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3120 (2000). 
118. 26 U.S.C. § 7871 (2000). 
119. 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000). 
120. 517 U.S. § 44 (1996) (holding that Congress could not abrogate state sovereign 
immunity under its Commerce power.) 
121. The amendments were part of the Indian Civil Right Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1301 
(2000). 
122. See, e.g., Native American Housing Assistance and Self Determination Act, Pub. L.  
No. 104, 330, 110 Stat. 4017 (1996) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 4101 (2000)).  See also  P.L. 106-
464, 25 U.S.C. § 4301 (2000). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated in this article, the Court in the last twenty years or so 
has devised principles of federal common law that are based on a flawed 
understanding of how and to what extent the tribes came to be incorporated 
into our political system, not as just another disadvantaged minority group, 
but as self-governing and distinct political entities with pre-existing sover-
eign rights.  In addition, the assumptions governing the development of the 
Court’s federal common law on Indian issues are contrary to the policies 
Congress has adopted and maintained since the late 1960s.  Finally, the 
Court’s record in reversing lower court’s pro-tribal decisions confirms that 
the Court is continuing its activist agenda by expanding the new principles 
devised for its age of colonialism.123 
 
 
123. See Philip Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial 
Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1 (1999). 
